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INNOVATIVE REGULATORY AND FINANCIAL PARAMETERS FOR 
ADVANCING CARBON CAPTURE AND STORAGE TECHNOLOGIES1 
 
Zen Makuch,2 Slavina Georgieva,3 Behdeen Oraee-Mirzamani4 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
In the post-industrial age, the realisation of 
inherent technical innovation potentials requires 
that stakeholders develop flexible, cooperation-
based frameworks if first mover opportunities and 
advantages are to be realised. In the Paris 
Agreement5 implementation context, carbon 
 
 
1 This article forms part of our ongoing IC4S Carbon Capture and 
Storage at Imperial College London research initiative. This article reflects our 
experience in conducting research within the CCS stakeholder community the 
results of which positively influenced the publication of analysis in a Summary 
Note from the European Commission entitled “Guidance Document 4, Article 
19 Financial Security and Article 20 Financial Contribution”. It also led to 
revisions to the first publicly available draft of “Guidance Document 4, Article 
19 Financial Security (“FS”) and Article 20 Financial Contribution” (“GD4”).  
Accordingly, in line with this research, the Summary Note clarifies that it is 
within the flexible discretion and, therefore, the legal jurisdiction of Member 
States to determine the options for establishing the level of financial security to 
be required of a CCS site operator (Article 19 of the CCS Directive) as well as 
the need for additional post-monitoring cost coverage (Article 20 of the CCS 
Directive).   Further to these research-based interventions, the Summary Note 
clarifies that the proxy 25% bottom line contingency suggested in the first draft 
of GD4 should be overlooked in favour of a more site-specific risk analysis.  
Accordingly, GD 4 was amended in this regard. Finally, the Summary Note 
accepts the role that public government insurance may play in the absence of 
commercial insurance particularly for “first mover” sites.  In this regard, the 
desire to reflect the cost of FS is noted in a new column for the Annex to GD 4 
analysing the cost of FS Options. All of these changes by way of the Summary 
Note and the revised final draft GD4 are, of course, welcomed as they make it 
more likely that CCS will be taken up by EU Member States in accordance 
with their Paris Agreement commitments. 
2 Director, Sustainable Transitions, Imperial College London, London, 
United Kingdom, Email: z.makuch@imperial.ac.uk 
3 Researcher, Imperial College London, London, United Kingdom 
Email: slavina.georgieva09@imperial.ac.uk  
4 Visiting Research Fellow, Imperial College London, London, United 
Kingdom Email: b.oraee@imperial.ac.uk  
5 What is the Paris Agreement, UNITED NATION CLIMATE CHANGE 
[UNCC] (2020), https://unfccc.int/process-and-meetings/the-paris-
agreement/what-is-the-paris-agreement, (At COP 21 in Paris, on 12 December 
2015, Parties to the UNFCCC reached a landmark agreement to combat climate 
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capture and storage technologies have emerged as 
a complementary adjunct to climate change 
mitigation and a diversified energy mix. However, 
developing the technology is not without technical 
and financial risks. The challenge for key 
stakeholders, primarily (but not exclusively) 
government and industry counterparts is to develop 
mutually reinforcing strategies, regulations and 
policies for testing and commercialising Carbon 
Capture and Storage (“CCS”) technologies and 
networks, as that will be determinative of their fate. 
 
In the Paris Agreement implementation 
period, the UK, for example, has indicated a 
commitment to bold greenhouse gas reductions 
(57% by 2030), and investment in CCS, as part of 
the ambitious emissions reductions targets set forth 
by the European Union, the deployment of which is 
meant to count for 20% of the greenhouse gas 
emissions captured by 2030. This has subsequently 
resulted in plans for several pilot CCS plants on UK 
soil. The up-scaling of CCS to the demonstration 
level, however, is dependent not only on the 
presence of sufficient interest and funding – an 
ongoing issue in the UK both pre- and post-Brexit - 
but also on the existence of appropriate regulatory 
conditions and options for additional private 
financing by industrial stakeholders. Furthermore, 
it is important to note that the up-scaling of projects 
from pilot to demonstration, and further on to a 
commercial-scale, is materializing in the context of 
a global financial crisis and a dip in investment 
trust in high-risk ventures.  
 
The development of CCS projects in 
individual states, is not only influenced by national 
regulatory regimes, policy developments, and 
fluctuations in financial markets, but is also 
dependent upon the legislative signals given from 
supra-national bodies and binding international 
 
change and to accelerate and intensify the actions and investments needed for a 
sustainable low carbon future. The Paris Agreement builds upon the 
Convention and – for the first time – brings all nations into a common cause to 
undertake ambitious efforts to combat climate change and adapt to its effects, 
with enhanced support to assist developing countries to do so. As such, it 
charts a new course in the global climate effort.). 
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agreements. In Europe, the CCS Directive’s 
approach to long term environmental and related 
financial risk has led to the current state of 
regulatory and financial uncertainty, thereby, 
giving rise to potentially uninsurable liabilities 
which dis-incentivise private sector investment in 
CCS technology.  This is in contrast with legislation 
in competing states including the United States, 
Norway, Canada and Australia.  
 
There is every indication that the paramount 
issue standing in the way of CCS is uncertainty over 
regulated financial security requirements for site 
operators and the nature and attribution of liability 
arising from leakage. This uncertainty could be 
addressed by a combination of insurance for 
storage sites and a robust permitting process, which 
would minimize the likelihood of leakage to 
virtually zero. There are, therefore, excellent 
reasons for national and international law and 
policymakers to seriously consider a more careful 
and tailored legislative and policy mix, so that 
regulatory oversight is in balance with innovative 
financial, insurance and liability mechanisms. In 
addition to exploring this subject matter, the article 
offers a number of recommendations for flexible, 
stakeholder partner-based advancement of CCS 
technology potentials in climate change and related 
environmental regulation.    
 
Keywords: Carbon Capture and Storage, CCS 
Risks, Long Term Liability, CCS Insurance, CCS 
Directive. 
 
INTRODUCTION6 
 
The inherent capacity to innovate is no longer enough to 
succeed in complex post-industrial societies. The resolution of 
innovation-related economic and regulatory risk is also of 
fundamental importance because we exist in a stakeholder milieu 
in which neither regulators nor economic actors have effective, 
 
6 The authors would like to thank Niall MacDowell, Paul Fennell, 
Alex Walker, Tim Cockerill (University of Leeds), Rob Gross and other 
colleagues in the Imperial College Centre for Energy Policy and Technology 
(“ICCEPT”) and the Centre for Environmental Policy (“CEP”) for their 
comments on this article and/or their academic support. 
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unilateral technology implementation capabilities.7 As such, 
implementing innovation now requires the flexible cooperation of 
key stakeholders.  
 
The UK is a European Union Member State known for its 
commercial pragmatism and strong commitment to the mitigation 
of climate change. This article informs Carbon Capture and Storage 
(“CCS”) stakeholders and other readers about the legal and 
financial context within which CCS technology currently stands.  It 
does so principally on a comparative basis by reference to several 
jurisdictions around the world that are implementing CCS or have 
experience with CO2 injection for enhanced oil recovery from 
reservoirs. Countries with a well-developed CCS regulatory 
approach are given particular attention. Finally, the article offers 
options that would allow for the construction of a best-fit regulatory 
scenario which adequately addresses liability and risk issues for 
CCS using the UK as a case study in view of its continuing interest 
in this technology in a Paris Agreement context. 
 
The Paris Agreement calls for countries to keep global 
surface temperature increases to well below 2° Celsius. Since the 
implementation period which commenced in 2016, comparatively 
little has happened in respect of emissions reductions noting the 
imperative nature of this potentially existential planetary challenge. 
Rather than a reduction, the Carbon Tracker projects a temperature 
rise to 3° – 3.4° even if current policies are implemented.8 An 
important overlooked source of GHG emissions is industry, whose 
projected share of emissions in a business-as-usual scenario may 
well rise to 52% of overall emissions by 2050.9 Furthermore, to this 
point, while electrification may provide a solution to our transport 
and heating-based GHG emissions, this is not the case for industrial 
 
7See Bellona Found., Moving CCS forward in Europe:, ENGO 
Network on CCS, BELLONA FOUND. 2 (May, 2013), 
http://content.ccrasa.com/library_1/5083%20-
%20Moving%20CCS%20forward%20in%20Europe.pdf. (It is arguable that 
the failure of the first round of the NER300 Programme - which would have 
allowed the sale of emissions allowances under the EU Emissions Trading 
Scheme in order to finance CCS demonstration projects – to yield even a single 
CCS project serves as testimony to the failure of Member States to work with 
industry in order to develop such projects.). 
8 See Climate Analytics and New Climate Institute, 2100 Warming 
Projections, CLIMATEACTIONTRACKER.ORG, 
https://climateactiontracker.org/global/temperatures/ (last updated Sept. 23, 
2020). 
9 Jan-Justus Andreas et al., An Industry’s Guide to Climate Action, 
BELLONA FOUNDATION (Nov. 26, 2018), 
https://network.bellona.org/content/uploads/sites/3/2018/11/Industry-Report-
final.pdf. 
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“process emissions” (those related to raw material inputs not fossil 
fuel burning). In Europe, de-carbonising cement, chemicals and 
steel industries would require five times the renewable energy 
currently being produced, seemingly an impossible task. This is 
one key reason why negative emissions technologies [e.g., for the 
purposes of this article, variously CCS, CC and Utilisation 
(“CCU”) and CC Utilisation and Storage/Sequestration (“CCUS”)] 
are fundamental to Paris Agreement compliance. 
 
In a Paris Agreement implementation context, the 
ambitious emissions reduction targets set forth by the European 
Union, coupled with the commitment to Carbon Capture and 
Storage (“CCS”) technology deployment, are meant to result in 
15% of greenhouse gas (“GHG”) emissions captured through this 
technology by 2030 (with a subsequent steady rise from then 
onwards).10 The UK has similarly indicated a commitment to bold 
GHG reductions and investment in CCS which has resulted in plans 
for several pilot carbon capture plants on UK soil.11 The up-scaling 
of CCS beyond the demonstration level, however, is dependent not 
only on the presence of sufficient interest and funding (from EU-
level and UK if not all governments with an interest in CCS), but 
also on the existence of appropriate regulatory conditions and 
options for additional private financing by industrial 
stakeholders.12 
 
Innovative financial and regulatory risk management 
solutions and incentives become all the more important when we 
recognise the commitments already being undertaken to design and 
 
10 Council Directive 2009/31, On the Geological Storage of Carbon 
Dioxide, 2009 O.J. (L 140) 114 (EC). 
11 Dep’t of Energy and Climate Change, CCS Roadmap, GOV.UK 
(May 2012), 
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/att
achment_data/file/48317/4899-the-ccs-roadmap.pdf; see also Global Status of 
CCS Report, Glob. CCS Inst., 
https://www.globalccsinstitute.com/resources/global-status-report/ (last visited 
Mar. 12, 2020) (stating that there are now 51 large-scale CCS facilities 
globally. These include 19 in operation, four under construction, and 28 in 
various stages of development. Of all the facilities in operation, 17 are in the 
industrial sector and 2 in power). 
12 See Worley Parsons, Strategic Analysis of the Global Status of 
Carbon Capture and Storage –Report Three: Country Studies: The European 
Union, GLOBAL CCS INSTITUTE (Mar. 31, 2009), 
https://www.globalccsinstitute.com/archive/hub/publications/8517/strategic-
analysis-global-status-ccs-country-study-european-union.pdf (It is noteworthy 
that any given Member state has the legal right not to allow CCS sites within 
its territory. If a sufficient number of Member States do not take up the 
opportunity to implement CCS then the 2030 target may not be met ab initio.). 
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build CCS projects. As Figure 1 (below) demonstrates, there are 
some 51 large scale CCS Facilities spanning 4 continents around 
the world with focal points in North America, Europe China and 
the Middle East. In total, 260 million tonnes of anthropogenic CO2 
has been safely stored to date.13  
 
Figure 1: Distribution of Large-Scale CCS Facilities (operation or 
construction)14 
 
 
 
Though this is somewhat encouraging, if we take a climate 
policy progressive jurisdiction such as the EU as an example, then 
we observe that total GHG emissions have only been reducing at 
an average of 50 Mt CO2-eq. per year since 1990 (the 1992 UN 
Climate Convention baseline year). In order to achieve its stated 
goal of climate neutrality by 2050, annual emissions reductions 
will need to increase to 130 Mt CO2-eq. The European 
Commission’s strategic compliance scenarios foresee an important 
role for CCS and CCU with 80-298 Mt of captured CO2 to be stored 
underground and 201-307 Mt to be utilised in synthetic fuels and 
materials respectively. For these projections to occur - noting that 
Europe’s two large scale CCS facilities capture 1.55 Mtpa CO2 for 
offshore storage – our storage and re-use capabilities must expand 
by a factor of 181-391 by the target carbon neutral date of 2050.15  
 
In order to achieve this, industry action and policy and 
regulation are beginning to show signs of progress. Accordingly: 
 
 
13 Global Status of CCS Report, supra note 11. 
14 The Global CCS Institute lists these CCS facilities which include 
capture, transport and storage of CO2 at a scale of 800,000 tonnes annually for 
a coal-based power plant or at least 400,000 tonnes of CO2 annually for other 
emissions-intensive industrial facilities (including natural gas-based power 
generation). see Facilities Database, GLOB. CCS INST. (2019), 
https://co2re.co/FacilityData.  
15 In-depth analysis in support of the Commission Communication 
COM (2018) 773, 2018 O.J. (C 773) 1. 
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• Norway is constructing a large-scale cement plant and a 
waste to energy incinerator with both featuring carbon 
capture capabilities that will result in additional shop and 
pipeline infrastructure for storage several kilometres 
offshore. This is part of a long-term plan to expand carbon 
storage infrastructure in a transnational context. 
• Sweden’s cement and steel sectors will both implement 
CCS capabilities and infrastructure in alignment with its 
carbon neutral plan for 2045. 
• The UK is planning to implement six large scale CCS 
projects in accordance with its 2030 Clean Growth Strategy 
which will implement CCS at scale during this period. 
• The USA has increased tax incentives for carbon storage 
(rather than release) from $10 to $50 t/CO2 as of 2018. 
• In the Netherlands, the port of Rotterdam will be the locus 
of CO2 pipeline and storage infrastructure given its central 
position for energy intensive industry. Accordingly, it plans 
to manage storage of several million tonnes of CO2 per year 
by 2030.16 
 
Noting these major project installations and infrastructure and the 
imperative to meet Paris Conventions GHG reduction targets, the 
time is now to evolve regulatory and financial risk management 
strategies and incentives for advancing nascent CCS and CCU 
initiatives. 
 
As it stands, CCS projects fall under the jurisdiction of 
international law (the OSPAR17 and London Dumping18 
Conventions). Interestingly, further to Article 6 of the 1996 
Protocol to the London Dumping Convention, a 2009 amendment 
to the Protocol exempts the export of CO2 for storage from the 
prohibition on exports of wastes and other matter to other countries 
for dumping or incineration at sea. However, only six of the 
required minima of thirty-four nations have ratified the 
amendment. It would be useful to explore how ratifying parties 
might work together to permanently advance their CO2 storage 
ambitions along the lines of the 2009 amendment.  This should be 
discussed with the contracting parties to the Convention so as not 
to unnecessarily inhibit efforts to develop storage infrastructure at 
 
16 Andreas, supra note 9. 
17 Convention for the Protection of the Marine Environment of the 
North-East Atlantic, Sept. 22, 1992, 2354 U.N.T.S. 67.  
18 Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping of 
Wastes and Other Matter, opened for signature Dec. 29, 1972, 1046 U.N.T.S. 
120 (entered into force Aug. 30, 1975).   
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sea.  Thankfully, a Resolution for Provisional Application of the 
2009 CCS Export Amendment now allows countries to collaborate 
in relation to the exportation and importation of CO2 for offshore 
geological storage.19 
 
In Europe, CCS projects are also regulated through 
provisions of the EU CCS20, Emissions Trading (“ET”)21 and 
Environmental Liability (“EL”)22 Directives. Furthermore, the up-
scaling of projects from pilot to demonstration, and then on to a 
commercial-scale, is materializing in the context of continuing 
global financial uncertainty, the COVID-19 pandemic and a dip in 
investment trust in high-risk ventures. Still, the EU CCS 
Directive’s approach to long term environmental and related 
financial risk has led to the current state of regulatory and financial 
uncertainty, thereby, giving rise to potentially uninsurable 
liabilities which dis-incentivise private sector investment in CCS 
technology.  
 
As we shall see, competing jurisdictions outside the EU, 
such as Norway, the USA, Canada and Australia have overcome 
this issue through innovative and flexible funding mechanisms and 
liability provisions. Even within the EU, the Member States of 
Germany and the Netherlands have made adaptations to their 
national laws which have allowed for the transposition of the EU 
CCS Directive in a way that does not impede investment in, and 
deployment of CCS demonstration projects in the near future. 
 
The next section of this article analyses the legal 
framework, which has emerged in European law, for the purpose of 
addressing liability for CCS projects. This is followed by an 
analysis of how the current policy scheme might affect the 
competitiveness of EU CCS projects in regards to their international 
counterparts and whether a risk-sharing regulatory approach is 
appropriate for CCS technologies. Finally, we focus on the possible 
scenarios - sets of regulatory and financing options - which may be 
 
19 Tim Dixon, Positive Result on the London Protocol's CCS Export 
Amendment, IEAGHG.ORG (Oct. 22, 2019), https://ieaghg.org/ccs-
resources/blog/positive-result-on-the-london-protocol-s-ccs-export-
amendment. 
20 Council Directive 2009/31, On the Geological Storage of Carbon 
Dioxide, 2009 O.J. (L 140) 114 (EC). 
21 Council Directive 2003/87, Establishing a Scheme for Greenhouse 
Gas Emission Allowance Trading within the Community and Amending 
Council Directive 96/61/EC, 2003 O.J. (L 275) 32 (EC). 
22 Council Directive 2004/35, On Environmental Liability with 
Regard to the Prevention and Remedying of Environmental Damage, 2004 O.J. 
(L 143) 56, 75 (CE). 
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advanced in order to coordinate CCS deployment in a manner that 
complies with EU law and enables fair and robust competition with 
projects in other jurisdictions. These options will also be of value 
to any nation with an interest in CCS. 
 
I. THE CCS DIRECTIVE, RELATED DIRECTIVES AND 
GUIDANCE DOCUMENT 4 (“GD4”) 23 
 
A. The CCS Directive 
 
In this section we examine the legislative architecture (and 
official guidance) around long term liability for CCS storage sites. 
We find that there is a large number of risk management powers, 
exclusively available to governmental Competent Authorities 
(CAs) at the same time that there are substantial financial and 
environmental liability risks placed on storage site operators. It is 
submitted that this apparent imbalance justifies corrective national 
legislative measures, for example by utilising a “cooperation” or 
“partnership”-based approach to long term liability management, 
as between site operators and regulators. 
 
The CCS Directive provides a significant number of risk 
management opportunities for UK regulators, while, at the same 
time, placing significant costs on storage operators. For example, 
regulators can choose not to approve storage sites with risky 
geological profiles or to seek strict permit conditions so that human 
error will be reduced, in respect of technical compliance. 
Additionally, among the regulatory risk management opportunities 
available to governments, is the right of authorities to require the 
following: 
 
• That no storage site which may leak or create undue 
environmental or health risks shall be permitted; 
• That no storage site shall be permitted without requisite 
levels of financial security24 and technical excellence; 
• That a storage site shall not operate without a permit and 
observance of all permit conditions; 
• That a storage site must feature effective monitoring and 
reporting requirements to the regulatory authority; 
 
23 Directorate-General for Climate Action, Implementation of 
Directive 2009/31/EC on the Geological Storage of Carbon Dioxide-Guidance 
Document Four, No. 070307/2009 of 15 June 2012, art. 19-20, 2009 O.J. (C 5) 
1, 41.  
24Id. at 3 (“Financial Security”, as used in the CCS Directive, 
defined). 
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• That the regulator must be notified immediately of leakages 
or irregularities at the site; 
• That a storage site will be closed for breach of permit 
conditions; 
• That the storage site operator will comply with strict 
closure and aftercare requirements; 
• That all environmental and related financial liabilities may 
be placed on the storage site operator; 
• That there shall be proportionate penalties for regulatory 
infractions; and, 
• That emission allowances be purchased to cover leakage 
events. 
 
The sheer weight and nature of risk management opportunities, 
available to the regulator, combined with the commensurate risk 
management standards, procedures and financial and related 
liability requirement placed upon the storage site operators, 
suggests that a “cooperation” or “partnership” approach to risk 
management and related long term and financial liability for 
leakage is necessary. The following analysis illustrates the 
significant consequences which storage site operators face in 
maintaining compliance with the CCS Directive. It also comments 
on the flexibility available to national authorities in devising long 
term liability and related financial instruments for advancing CCS 
within the UK’s legislative framework. This “flexibility” analysis 
should reassure regulators that there are significant opportunities 
available to regulators to incentivise CCS investment, and 
subsequent technological and regulatory success, when 
determining the long term liability and financial provisions that are 
to be applied to storage site operators through the transposition of 
the CCS Directive. 
 
Analysis of the CCS Directive articles which address direct 
liability for operators. 
 
Article 17: Closure and Aftercare 
 
“A storage site shall be closed: 
a. if the relevant conditions stated in the permit are met; 
b. at the substantiated request of the operator, after 
authorisation of the competent authority; 
c. if the competent authority so decides after the withdrawal 
of a storage permit pursuant to Article 11(3).” 
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In essence, once a site is deemed closed, liabilities pass to 
the state (excluding monitoring and corrective measures). The time 
limit before such passage could be long (decades), unless 
appropriate needed legislative certainty is provided. A site can, 
therefore, be shut if the operator or authority wants to close it, or if 
its life has expired. There is a large liability placed on the operator, 
if the site were to close earlier than expected, as set-up and 
operational costs might not be fully covered. Nothing in this Article 
prevents the sharing of risk between the operator and other parties 
including the Competent Authority. The same observation applies 
to the regulation of long-term liability and financial instruments. 
 
Article 18: Transfer of Responsibility 
 
Where a storage site has been closed pursuant to points (a) 
or (b) of Article 17(1), all legal obligations relating to monitoring 
and corrective measures pursuant to the requirements laid down in 
this Directive, the surrender of allowances in the event of leakages 
pursuant to Directive 2003/87/EC and preventive and remedial 
action pursuant to Articles 5(1) and 6(1) of Directive2004/35/EC, 
shall be transferred to the competent authority on its own initiative 
or upon request from the operator.25 
 
An operator needs approval to close the site, whilst rigs and 
pumps are still installed. The Competent Authority can decide to 
release the operator before 20 years is up, if they are satisfied the 
gas is safe; this is an opportunity for the operator to obtain earlier 
handover, particularly if the site geology is suitable. If the 
geological conditions are suitable for earlier handover, this would 
release the operator of liabilities, and reduce insurance or bond 
costs. Therefore, bonds or insurance need to be negotiated on this 
basis. This article does not prevent a more flexible approach to 
addressing long term liability measures, nor does it preclude the 
use of incentives, in addressing financial and practical burdens of 
long-term site liability.  
 
The transfer of responsibility, from the operator to the 
Competent Authority, adds further risk reduction measures to the 
arsenal of Competent Authority requirements. It should be noted, 
however, that there is a need to define the handover timeline, with 
a preferred specified handover period, as this would create 
regulatory and insurance-related certainty. One such approach 
would be for regulators to define a band of time from the storage 
site closure date to 20-30 years afterwards when liability would 
 
25 Id.  
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then pass on to Competent Authorities. Furthermore, there could 
be a chosen date within that time band which is deemed “an 
average” date for achieving liability transfer.  Of course, that date 
would not be fixed and will depend on the specifics of each CCS 
project.  However, it would serve as a marker for both the CCS and 
insurance industries. 
 
Article 19: Financial Security (“FS”)  
 
“Member States shall ensure proof that adequate financial 
security is presented by the potential operator as part of the 
application for a storage permit.” Use of cash, securities, bonds, 
insurances or loan facilities can be used to give security. Operator 
must show they can afford to run the site (including after closure 
for at least 20 years minimum). Article does not preclude use of 
incentives to assist operators in addressing long term liability costs. 
Language offers great flexibility; an equivalent alternative to 
financial security is permissible as part of the permit application.26 
“Member States shall ensure that the operator makes a financial 
contribution available to the competent authority before the 
transfer of responsibility pursuant to Article 18 has taken place.”27 
 
The monitoring period is 20 years. Costs to the authority 
need to be itemised, so that the operator can allow for them at 
tender. If CCS activities are successful, then the minimum financial 
contribution in respect of monitoring is all that will have to be paid 
in relation to the post-closure period. This article does not interfere 
with a flexible approach to liability and financial instrument 
regulation. 
 
Article 28: Penalties 
 
“Member States shall lay down the rules on penalties 
applicable to infringements of the national provisions adopted 
pursuant to this Directive and take all measures necessary to ensure 
that they are implemented.”28 
 
26 See id. at 16, (Further to some of our original research presented to 
the European Commission, an explicit paragraph was added to the Final GD4 
(Section 2.1, page 1), seeking that at Member State level, a balance be struck 
between regulatory oversight and pricing risk such that nations are not 
“overpricing the risks in relation to these obligations for early movers”.  In 
much the same vein, new language was added to GD4 advising Member states 
to adopt a “middle ground” when conducting a site-specific risk profile). 
Article 20: Financial Contributions 
27 Id. 
28 Id. 
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This standard penalty provision is not logically connected 
to the design of risk management and liability mechanisms as 
penalties are considered to apply solely to breach of Directive 
provisions. Liability matters are addressed under the 
Environmental Liability Directive. The operator must, 
nevertheless, ensure that there is full compliance with CCS 
Directive requirements, as penalties are likely to occur for permit 
breaches and failure to submit monitoring report data. Non-
compliance with these risk management-related measures can be 
punished by the Competent Authority. This Article does not 
contradict a more flexible approach to risk management and 
liability sharing beyond the operator, provided that penalties are 
proportional to liabilities. 
 
Article 34 Amendment of Directive 2004/35/EC 
 
“In Annex III to Directive (2004/35/EC) (The 
Environmental Liability Directive), the following paragraph shall 
be added: ’14. The operation of storage sites pursuant to Directive 
2009/31/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 
April 2009 on the geological storage of CO2 (‘); Article 4.1 This 
(Environmental Liability) Directive shall not cover environmental 
damage or an imminent threat of such damage caused by ... b. a 
natural phenomenon of exceptional, inevitable and irresistible 
character.”29 
 
Operators have obligations in respect of the prevention and 
remediation of environmental damage, associated with such sites. 
Financial security measures are also to be undertaken by storage 
site operators further to Article 14. A flexible interpretation of 
Article 14 allows for use of ceilings on financial instruments as 
well as exclusion of liability on behalf of operators, where they are 
not at fault or are otherwise not negligent. It is also important to 
note that a CCS operator will not be liable for environmental 
damage or the imminent threat of damage in relation to a natural 
phenomenon of exceptional, inevitable and irresistible character. 
 
From the preceding analysis, we can establish that, as a 
minimum, CCS Directive Articles 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 28 and 34 all 
provide Competent Authorities with liability management powers. 
The following Articles (in Table 2) achieve the same with risk 
management functions, thus adding to overall liability management 
powers for Competent Authorities. 
 
29 Id. 
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In regards to risk management, the Directive articles which 
address this issue are the following:  
 
Article 4: Selection of Storage Sites 
 
“Member States shall retain the right to determine the areas 
from which storage sites may be selected pursuant to the 
requirements of this Directive.”30 It is both possible and advisable 
for Member States to consult with technical experts and other 
stakeholders when determining site selection. A partnership 
approach to the site-selection process could induce joint 
involvement in shared liability. 
 
Article 11: Changes. Review, Update and Withdrawal of Storage 
Permits 
 
1. The operator shall inform the competent authority of any 
changes planned in the operation of the storage site, 
including changes concerning the operator.31 
2. Member States shall ensure that no substantial change is 
implemented without a new or updated storage permit 
issued in accordance with this Directive. Annex II, point 13, 
first indent of Directive 85/337/EEC shall apply in such 
cases.32 
3. The competent authority shall review and where necessary 
update or, as a last resort, withdraw the storage permit: (a) 
if it has been notified or made aware of any leakages or 
significant irregularities pursuant to Article 16(1); (b) if the 
reports submitted pursuant to Article 14 or the 
environmental inspections carried out pursuant to Article 
15 show non-compliance with permit conditions or risks of 
leakages or significant irregularities; (c) if it is aware of any 
other failure by the operator to meet the permit conditions; 
(d) if it appears necessary on the basis of the latest scientific 
findings and technological progress; or (e) without 
prejudice to points (a) to (d), five years after issuing the 
permit and every 10 years thereafter.33 
4. After a permit has been withdrawn pursuant to paragraph 3, 
the competent authority shall either issue a new storage 
permit or close the storage site pursuant to Article 17(1)(c). 
 
30 Id. 
31 Id. 
32 Id. 
33 Id. 
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Until a new storage permit has been issued, the competent 
authority shall temporarily take over all legal obligations 
relating to acceptance criteria where the competent 
authority decides to continue CO2 injections, monitoring 
and corrective measures pursuant to the requirements laid 
down in this Directive, the surrender of allowances in cases 
of leakage pursuant to Directive 2003/87/EC and 
preventive and remedial action pursuant to Articles 5(1) 
and 6(1) of Directive 2004/35/EC.34 
 
In respect of commercial scale storage sites, it is worth 
recalling that geological storage will extend over long periods of 
time. Therefore, the CCS Directive spells out framework 
requirements to ensure the long-term stewardship of storage sites. 
The Directive, thus, provides for the possibility for sites to be 
transferred to Member State control in the long term. However, that 
can only occur once the Competent Authority has been assured that 
no leakage is likely to occur (the operator retains responsibility for 
a site whilst it presents a significant risk of leakage). Under the 
CCS Directive, a storage site shall be transferred (legal liabilities 
included) to the state when: 
 
• All available evidence indicates that the CO2 will be 
completely contained for the indefinite future; 
• A minimum period before transfer to be determined by the 
Competent Authority has elapsed; 
• A financial contribution for the post-transfer period 
covering at least the costs for monitoring for 30 years has 
been made and; 
• The site has been sealed and the injection facilities have 
been removed. As this is the second key decision in the 
lifecycle of a storage site (the first being the decision to 
permit the site for use), a Commission review is foreseen at 
this stage too. 
 
There is a perception within EU regulatory circles (see CCS 
Directive, Article 18) that potential storage site operator liabilities 
and financial obligations end within approximately 20 years post 
storage site closure (given as a minimum period). However, the 
nature of Directive Article 18.1-2 language is such that the 
conditions 1(a) “complete and permanent storage” may not be 
proven by that time; (b) the 20-year period is a minimum; and 2(c) 
site evolution “towards a situation of long-term stability” may not 
be proven by that time. As such, this imprecise Directive language 
 
34 Id. 
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offers regulators an open door to deny the transfer of responsibility 
from the storage site operator to the Competent Authority at the 20-
year threshold. In such circumstances, it has previously been 
demonstrated, that regulators do not accept such a transfer of 
responsibility in analogous environmental law fields (in Canada 
and the United States) pertaining to waste management facilities 
and contaminated land sites. Notably, transfers can be indefinitely 
stalled by Competent Authorities through requests for more 
monitoring data for example. This issue ought to be considered by 
industry when discussing and agreeing permit conditions with 
particularly risk averse governments. 
 
B. Environmental Liability Directive 
 
The CCS Directive itself does not address the specific 
mechanics of liability. Hence, we must look to the Environmental 
Liability Directive and the Emissions Trading Scheme Directive as 
the CCS Directive delegates this matter to them. 
 
Further to Article 34 of the CCS Directive, the 
Environmental Liability Directive brings storage site operations 
within the liability framework of the European Union. As such, 
operators of CCS sites have obligations in respect of the prevention 
and remediation of environmental damage associated with such 
sites. This applies to all relevant “environmental damage” and 
corresponding duties of prevention (Article 5) and 
remediation/mitigation (Article 6) under the Environmental 
Liability Directive. Financial security measures are also to be 
undertaken by storage site operators further to Article 14 of the 
Environmental Liability Directive. A flexible interpretation of 
Article 14 allows for the use of ceilings on financial instruments. It 
also allows for the exclusion of liability on behalf of operators, 
where they are not at fault, are otherwise not negligent or a force 
majeure exception is available.  
 
C. Emissions Trading Directive 
 
If we move on to the Emissions Trading Directive, by virtue 
of the inclusion of geological storage sites under Annex I of the 
Emissions Trading Directive, installations will be required to 
surrender allowances for any emissions from the site (including 
leakage) as calculated pursuant to the Monitoring and Reporting 
Guidelines for CCS. The amount of the Financial Security (“FS”) 
for this obligation can be based on the potential total tons of 
emissions, including due to leakage(s), multiplied by the market 
cost of purchasing an equivalent amount of allowances. This 
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calculation will require (1) estimates for the total tons of emissions 
that may be released, including due to leakage(s), (2) the timing of 
emissions, and (3) costs of allowances when releases occur.  
 
It is worth noting that Commission GD4, which is discussed 
in more detail in the next section, has excised language from its 
draft version, that specifically did not recommend the 
determination of FS (for the surrender of allowances due to 
leakages) by multiplying the estimated amount of funds by the 
probability that the scenario occurs. Now, a “realistic and 
appropriate middle ground scenario taking into account all 
available evidence of the site-specific risk profile is used” as 
recommended.  In addition, GD4 contains a method for the 
“calculation of the potential leakage amount based on a probability 
distribution of the amount of leakage from the storage complex” 
when ”there is a proposed use of probability distribution for 
determining the size of a leak (not the probability that it will 
occur)”. It also gives regulators the choice of selecting a risk 
percentile for the size of the leakage to be used instead as an 
estimate, instead of an inflexible 25% default contingency for FS. 
Furthermore, there is specific mention of the fact that FS amounts 
may now be updated “in case of leakage or significant 
irregularities, or where the monitoring plan is updated pursuant to 
Annex II of the CCS Directive”. Further to our original research, 
which underlined the purpose of site-specific risk assessment, GD4 
now emphasises that risk profiles differ by the type and upkeep of 
a storage site and that financial contributions by operators ought to 
reflect that. Taken as a whole, these amendments grant more 
flexibility for the development and implementation of a risk 
estimation curve that can be co-delivered by government and 
industry cooperating on a site-specific basis.  
 
GD4 observations aside, there is unavoidable uncertainty 
about the future price of EU Allowances (“EUA”) at the time of 
any potential leakage. There is no cap on the EUA price; the 
penalty for excess emissions (100 Euros per tonne) does not relieve 
the operator of the need to provide allowances to cover the 
emissions and is not therefore a cap on EUA prices.   
 
The need to hedge against such risk becomes important 
when it is likely that liability for allowances would entail greater 
costs over time, as carbon prices rise.  Furthermore, the assumption 
of long-term emissions credits liability would mean that 
allowances which are bought in the future, as a compensatory 
measure for loss of CO2 stored, would be with a significantly 
higher price range than those bought today, which would only 
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further defer investments. Therefore, as such, a liability of this kind 
is not insurable and presents an incalculable risk to potential 
storage site operators. 
 
It is worth noting that, in terms of financial risk derived 
from liability, the purchase of emissions credits serves as a climate 
change mitigation and prevention strategy in itself. Arguably, 
damage in terms of failed climate change mitigation is already 
covered in respect of the types of damage listed in the EU 
Environmental Liability Directive (2004/35/EC) (including, but 
not limited to species loss, marine ecosystem damage, fundamental 
changes in land use, damage to land, damage to water, etc.). These 
types of damage occur as a result of anthropogenic climate change 
as well, which is why CO2 as a pollutant has already been 
determined to be remediated under climate change mitigation 
measures.  Accordingly, if capture operators are legally required to 
buy emissions credits and storage operators are also bound to cover 
liability for the same leakage event, there is an apparent double-
payment by the operator. This problem of double-counting liability 
should be addressed by counterbalanced regulatory solutions that 
push forward CCS technology investment. 
 
D. Implementation of Directive 2009/31/EC on the 
Geological Storage of Carbon Dioxide, European 
Commission Guidance Document 4 
 
Further to the prompting behind our original research and 
inputs to the European Commission Inter-Service and stakeholder 
consultations around financial instruments and liability for CCS, 
GD4 has met expectations that it would enhance flexibility for 
regulators to design and implement innovative solutions to long 
term liability and shows a greatly relaxed language, as to the 
financial options available to Member States. There is much at 
stake in this regard, as the absence of such solutions could likely 
cause prospective firms that are interested in CCS storage to 
withdraw said interest. As it stands, GD4 broadly encourages 
Member States to secure the payment of the Financial Contribution 
(“FC”) through the instruments and procedures described for FS. It 
recommends options that are simple, established, and low risk. 
Accordingly, complex financial arrangements are to be avoided as 
falling outside the core competencies of Competent Authorities; 
they are arrangements that appear to flout financial principles (e.g., 
more certainty and higher return) and may contain hidden risks. 
The intent of FS and FC is to protect taxpayers and these 
programmes are not intended to be used for financial speculation. 
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GD4 pays particular attention to the flexibilities of 
interpretation around Articles 19 and 20.  With regard to Article 
19, the following considerations are suggested in GD4: 
 
• FS should be periodically adjusted to take account of 
changes to the assessed risk of leakage and the estimated 
costs of the obligations to be addressed. This gives 
flexibility to operators if they are able to establish low risk 
(or declining risk).  
• FS instruments can include funds, financial institution 
guarantees, insurance, and first party and related party 
guarantees irrevocable trust funds, escrow, letter of credit, 
or surety bonds. Operators may also offer EUAs as 
equivalent to FS but their acceptance depends on the 
Member State assessment that the EUAs provide sufficient 
certainty, amount, liquidity and duration as well as the 
assurance that the same EUAs are not held as FS for any 
other purposes at the same time. The determination of FS 
by multiplying the estimated amount of funds for a 
corrective measures scenario, by the probability that the 
scenario will occur, is not recommended (due to the fact 
that if the likelihood of requiring certain corrective 
measures is considered to be very low, such an expected 
value calculation, will result in an amount of FS that will 
be inadequate in the actual event of such FS being needed) 
unless the calculation of the potential leakage amount is 
based on a probability distribution. 
• Member State and national Competent Authorities may use 
specific types of allowable FS mechanisms that might be 
derived from existing laws and regulations about FS 
instruments that are acceptable for closure and post-closure 
care of waste landfills, for wastes from extractive 
industries, decommissioning of offshore structures, trans-
frontier movements of hazardous wastes, environmental 
liabilities under Directive 2004/35/EC (“ELD”) and other 
relevant national programmes.  
• Determining an appropriate amount of FS for surrender of 
allowances ought to be based upon a “realistic and 
appropriate middle ground scenario taking account of all 
available evidence of the site-specific risk profile” and a 
“calculation of the potential leakage amount based on a 
probability distribution of the amount of leakage from the 
storage complex”. 
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Article 20 shares the intent (of Article 19) that the post-
transfer costs, of at least the monitoring obligation for a period of 
30 years, need to be fully covered by the operator and that 
necessary funds be readily available to the CA. However, GD4 
gives further interpretation to some mechanisms which can be used 
to finance this long-term liability: 
 
• It should not be assumed that the idea of a prepaid insurance 
policy for financial assurance of geological sequestration 
site closure and post closure monitoring would necessarily 
also extend to an additional 30 years of monitoring after the 
transfer of responsibility.  
• The CCS Directive does not require that the FC cover the 
full estimated amount of the costs which the CA will incur 
for the post-transfer obligations. However, there is no 
restriction on setting the amount of the FC at a value that 
might represent the full costs of those obligations. 
• With respect to determining the amount of FC, Member 
State may allow the use of expected value techniques for 
estimating FC amounts for contingent obligations in 
addition to using more deterministic approaches to 
estimating the FC for monitoring. In other words, when 
calculating an amount for FC, the probability of each type 
of contingent event may be factored into the cost estimates. 
• Member States with multiple storage sites can pool the risks 
of contingent obligations to some degree. Where the 
Member State intends for the operator’s FC to cover the 
CA’s full costs, then the expected value approach should 
not be used. 
• Elements related to the history of storing CO2 also may be 
relevant in determining the post-transfer obligations of the 
CA. In particular, the occurrence of leakages or significant 
irregularities, detection of significant adverse effects and 
assessment of the effectiveness of corrective measures 
taken may affect estimates of the probability, duration, 
scale and scope, intensity and timing of post-transfer 
obligations. 
 
In discussing CCS long-term liabilities, GD4 authors have 
demonstrated the knowledge that a risk-sharing approach, such as 
commercial insurance or risk pooling, would be preferable. 
Specifically, they have acknowledged that obligations, which 
appear least likely to arise, namely, corrective measures due to 
leakages and surrender of allowances due to leakages, are also 
those which would impose the largest cost burden (this being the 
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case, particularly, for the surrender of allowances). Thus, they 
recommend that, for a well-developed technology, with a large 
number of relatively homogeneous sites and a long empirical 
history, some kind of risk-sharing approach be established; 
insurance is given as an example. They also do mention, however, 
that the lack of experience with CCS and other factors creates a 
high degree of uncertainty in estimating probabilities and 
magnitudes of leakages. Interestingly, following our original 
research, the revisions that appear in GD4, have resulted in a 
‘softening’ of the language regarding the sufficiency of existing 
data. As such, GD4 could be interpreted as being more open to the 
contribution of expertise (regarding the estimation of high-risk 
low-probability events such as leakages) from industrial 
stakeholders. 
 
By way of a counterbalance, GD4 does recognise that an 
overly cautious approach would penalise the technology in its early 
years, by requiring more security than the actual risk warrants. 
GD4 authors recommend that Member States steer between these 
extremes, in particular by evaluating risk during the site 
characterisation phase. They perceive that the information, thus 
gathered, may serve as a sufficient basis for a financial security 
regime to be constructed specifically for CO2 leakages -  a regime 
which would take reasonable account of the limited risk of the more 
extreme events, whilst not distorting the costs of CCS or exposing 
the taxpayer.  
 
Overall, the revised language in GD4 is more flexible 
regarding the financing options available to Member States. The 
revision now explicitly adopts that allowance be made for 
public/Member State insurance. The opinions put forth by its 
authors are encouraging, especially with regards to demonstration 
phase projects, where certain allowances will be made. For 
example, Member States are granted the opportunity to provide 
public insurance, in the absence of commercial insurance, by 
accepting transfer of risk in relation to surrender of allowances, in 
exchange for a non-refundable premium. This is a useful option, as 
it helps to resolve the inherent risk that attends otherwise 
uninsurable activities and events.  Should that insurance be 
provided in conditions that are more favourable than those of the 
market, this may come under State Aids obligations and the 
Commission must be notified. The same requirement applies to 
post-demonstration phase fully commercial sites.   
 
It must be noted, however, that Member States are 
cautioned that methods for meeting the FS must be found, even 
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when there are few CCS projects on the ground. Member States are 
allowed to pool FS arrangements for first mover sites, in order to 
increase the number of projects participating in the insurance 
scheme and finance any liability in excess of the pool by 
establishing a method for profit and loss sharing. This option is 
sensible, provided that risk pooling is adjusted for individual site 
characteristics – including both technical and financial risks. Care 
would also need to be taken in ensuring that profit and loss sharing 
calculations do not involve cross-subsidisation as between firms. 
 
Other risk-sharing arrangements may be possible, as GD4 
is not exhaustive on this point. Therefore, this ought to encourage 
Member States to appropriate a flexible approach to leakage 
liability, particularly in the deployment of demonstration projects. 
This attitude may well encourage investment in CCS technology 
rollout, as well as mandate data gathering for important statistical 
measures, as to the exact risk parameters associated with long-term 
storage of CO2. Once complete, this data will enable authorities to 
draft permitting and regulatory measures, which are appropriate to 
the full-scale commercial rollout of CCS. 
 
Overall, a pragmatic view of European Commission CCS GD4 
would be one where the required security and additional 
contingency measures are assessed on a site-by-site basis. A 
distinction ought to be made between liabilities in the 
demonstration and commercialisation phases, as demonstration 
projects will be facing first-of-a-kind issues. If a Member State has 
issued a permit to the operator, it should assume that there is very 
low risk of that site leaking (issues of past oil well, related access 
to info, and other site characteristics will have been made public, 
etc.). The operator and the Competent Authority ought to, 
therefore, agree to a shared risk profile, perhaps through an 
insurance mechanism, which would allow risk exposure to be 
capped for the operator. 
 
E. Review of the CCS Directive 
 
The first European Commission Report on the review of 
Directive 2009/31/EC on the geological storage of carbon dioxide, 
does not provide a significant change to the state of the legislation 
as is, but rather elucidates some of the thinking around CCS 
development, indicating the preferred methods of market 
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incentivisation, without disbarring any of the flexible options 
discussed in this article.35  
 
Overall, the report concludes that the Directive is “fit for 
purpose and sets up the necessary regulatory framework to ensure 
the safe capture, transport and storage of carbon dioxide while 
allowing the Member States sufficient flexibility.”36 Furthermore, 
it considers transposition measures to be complete, for all but one 
Member State, and is advancing with conformity checks.  The 
safety provisions and legal certainty emanating from the CCS 
Directive and GD4 are, therefore, seen as providing sufficient 
signals to investors and any changes to the Directive, at this stage, 
are discouraged, in order to not de-stabilize the efforts made so far.  
 
However, despite the overall favourable review, there is an 
acknowledgment by EU policymakers that the development of 
CCS in Europe has been lacking, with a dearth of practical 
knowledge impacting the ability to review available legislation in 
a thorough manner. For example, there is a need to identify whether 
and what existing transport and potential storage infrastructure is 
suitable for reuse including by reference to existing natural gas 
infrastructure and facilities and information sharing thereupon. It 
would be of considerable utility for the EU and her Member States 
to build these research components into existing research funding 
programmes. A similar observation applies to other sub-surface 
geological formations noting that the costs of acquisition, 
exploration and related data acquisition can amount to €6 ($8) - €20 
($25) per tonne of CO2.
37 When this information is made available 
then regulators should consider how to transfer or licence such 
infrastructure for CO2 transport and storage purposes vis-a-vis 
incumbent owners/rights holders while ensuring that said 
regulators have the legal competence to regulate offshore facilities. 
It is interesting to note that, in comparative terms, the United States 
and Canada should also look to address the offshore regulation of 
CCS as they have yet to do so.38 This is particularly the case for the 
 
35 Report from the Commission to the European Parliament and the 
Council on the Implementation of Directive 2009/31/EC on the Geological 
Storage of Carbon Dioxide, COM (2014) 099 Final (Feb. 25, 2014). 
36 Id. 
37 ZEP, The Costs of CO2 Capture, Transport and Storage: Post-
demonstration CCS in the EU, GLOB. CCS INST. (July 20, 2011), 
https://www.globalccsinstitute.com/resources/publications-reports-
research/the-costs-of-co2-capture-transport-and-storage-post-demonstration-
ccs-in-the-eu/. 
38 See R. W. Webb & Gerrard, M.B., Overcoming Impediments to 
Offshore CO2 Storage: Legal Issues in the United States and Canada, 49, 
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United States as the Department of Energy’s Energy Technology 
Laboratory announced $18 million for four offshore projects.  
 
In a related development, last year’s first annual general 
meeting of the Gulf of Mexico Offshore Projects reported the joint 
aim “to develop partnerships which will work on storage 
assessment, risk assessment and modelling, identifying monitoring 
technologies for offshore, infrastructure re-purposing (pipelines, 
platforms, and wells), regulatory considerations, and knowledge 
dissemination and outreach”.39 As such, relevant offshore CCS 
legislation will need to follow particularly once the demonstration 
phase for these projects is complete. Rather encouragingly, in May 
2019, United States Senator John Cornyn (Republican, Texas) 
introduced Bill 1675 seeks to promote the research, development 
and commercialisation of natural gas carbon capture technologies, 
including through private sector partnerships on demonstration 
projects.40  However, said legislation does not address CCS 
operations beyond this phase.  Further to these initiatives, the low 
carbon price and the high cost of implementation for Member 
States remain as significant barriers facing the desired whole-scale 
deployment of CCS in 2030. Specific examples are made of 
successful CCS projects outside of the EU, which often provide an 
added economic benefit (through the use of Enhanced Oil 
Recovery, a technique that is well-established in the USA).  
 
The acknowledgement of these issues, however, is not seen 
to require any further legislative intervention on an EU level. The 
Commission sees Articles 19 and 20 as giving enough scope to 
Member States, to decide how operators should prove their ability 
to safely operate and monitor storage sites including up to the 
transfer of responsibility to the Competent Authority. Furthermore, 
as there is not enough practical experience, there is deemed to be a 
lack of experience with Article 18 (i.e., post-closure transfers of 
site liability to the competent authority), which will have to wait 
until the next Commission review to be updated, if that is seen as 
 
ENVTL. L. REP., 10634, 10634-10647, (2019) (According to the authors, these 
jurisdictions regulate offshore CCS through a patchwork of laws rather than a 
specifically designed offshore CCS framework. This will make the 
advancement of offshore CCS in places such as the Cascadia Basin - a large 
offshore basalt rock formation with considerable storage potential – a 
challenging proposition.). 
39 Tim Dixon, Gulf of Mexico Offshore Projects First Annual Meeting, 
IEAGHG.ORG (Feb. 13, 2019), https://ieaghg.org/ccs-resources/blog/gulf-of-
mexico-offshore-projects-first-annual-meeting. 
40  Nick Snow, US Senate Bill Would Boost Carbon Capture 
Research, 117, OIL & GAS J., 1, (2019).  
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necessary. GD4 revision is also deferred to within 5 years’ time as 
we await more practical knowledge. 
 
In essence, the only new feedback from the 2014 
Commission review report is to point to the reforms of the EU 
carbon market and ETS Directive as the major expected drivers for 
CCS and to demur on the issue of Emission Performance Standards 
as an unnecessary adjunct to the ETS reform. The legislative 
framework available (CCS Directive and GD4) will remain in 
place, unchanged in the near future, and incentivisation of CCS 
projects will either have to wait for the promised ETS reform, or to 
take advantage of the flexibility inherent in the Directive and 
Guidance documents in addressing the heretofore neglected long-
term liability issues. If anything, we can see that while the 
Commission is thinking of the low carbon price as a barrier, there 
is, so far, a lack of acknowledgement that long-term liability and 
risk provide equally strong, negative investment signals.  
 
This is further evidenced in the summary opinions that the 
European Commission has issued on two CCS permit applications. 
Further to Article 10 [(1) - (2)] of the CCS Directive, the European 
Commission is given the opportunity to issue non-binding opinions 
on such draft storage permits.  In the case of Block P18A of the 
Dutch Continental Shelf, a proposal in which the scientific advice 
indicates effectively no leakage, environmental or health risk, the 
Commission sought additional legal assurances in respect of: 
 
• Notification of leakage risk (CCS Directive Articles 8 and 
9); 
• A requirement that the wells in the adjacent P-15-9 
reservoir must be CO2 secure as a condition of their closure 
(CCS Directive Article 8); 
• Specific permit provisions on changes, review, updating 
and withdrawal of the storage permit (CCS Directive 
Articles 8 and 9); 
• Further information on the financial security for the project 
which otherwise “appears to be at a very early stage” (CCS 
Directive Articles 8 and 9);  
• Further professional development and technical training of 
the operator and all staff (CCS Directive Article 8); and, 
• The processes, findings and outcome of the Environmental 
Impact Assessment pursuant to Article 5 of the 
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(Environmental Impact Assessment) Directive 
85/337/EEC.41 
 
The European Commission reserved its rights to intervene 
further in the storage application and permitting process as 
development consent has not been granted at this stage.  Similarly, 
in the case of the UK draft permit for carbon dioxide storage in the 
depleted Goldeneye gas condensate field on the UK Continental 
Shelf, the European Commission warned the UK that it had not 
provided sufficient information in its first draft permit submission 
(upon which a second submission was subsequently satisfactorily 
submitted and reviewed). The site features a negligible risk of 
leakage, environmental or health risk. In its Opinion, the 
Commission calls attention to a dispute over the post-closure 
transfer of responsibility of the site with Shell (Petroleum) UK 
indicating 6 years and the competent authority calling for 20 years 
in accordance with the Directive. This dispute is also vital to a 
determination as to whether the legal requirement for adequate 
financial security has been satisfied. Unsurprisingly, as with the 
Dutch permit application, the Commission opinion has withheld its 
approval of the UK draft permit for carbon dioxide storage until 
such time as an Environment Statement (in relation to an 
Environmental Impact Assessment), which evaluates the effects of 
substances other than CO2 that are present in CO2 streams, is 
completed and approved. The same applies to agreement upon and 
provision of evidence of financial security for the full 20-year post 
closure monitoring period (CCS Articles 18 and 19).42  
In summary, these two storage permit applications offer 
further evidence of the need to address project proposal risk in the 
context of CCS Directive barriers to the realisation of CCS as a 
viable contributor to climate change mitigation in a much-needed 
 
41 Relating to the Draft Permit for the Permanent Storage of Carbon 
Dioxide in Block Section P18-4 of Block Section P18a of the Dutch 
Continental Shelf, in Accordance with Article 10(1) of Directive 2009/31/EC of 
23 April 2009 on the Geological storage of Carbon Dioxide, COM (2012) 
1236 Final (Feb. 28, 2012). 
42 On a Draft Permit for the Permanent Storage of Carbon Dioxide in 
the Depleted Goldeneye Gas Condensate Field Located in Blocks 14/28b, 
14/29a, 14/29e, 20/3b, 20/4b and 20/4c on the United Kingdom Continental 
Shelf, in Accordance with Article 10(1) of Directive 2009/31/EC of 23 April 
2009 on the Geological Storage of Carbon Dioxide, COM (2016) 152 Final 
(Jan. 20, 2016). 
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Paris Agreement implementation framework. Pursuant to the 
second Report on the Implementation of Directive 2009/31/EC 
(The CCS Directive), we shall see whether the Commission is 
similarly disposed to CCS as a means of implementing the Paris 
Agreement when we obtain the Commission opinions on an 
application for a storage permit that is being reviewed in Italy and 
an application for the Q16 Maas field further to the Netherlands 
ROAD project43. This is not known at the time of the third report 
on the implementation of the Directive (October, 2019). On a more 
optimistic note, according to the Commission “a considerable 
number of Member States and Norway continue to support or plan 
to support projects in the near future, through their national 
programmes or funds, research and demonstration activities on 
CCS”.44 As well, the Dutch CCS Porthos project has submitted two 
further storage permit applications and sought an amendment to an 
existing permit while Norway has awarded an exploration permit 
for CO2 storage on the Norwegian Continental Shelf.
45 Another 
application for an exploration permit has been filed in Andalucía, 
Spain.46 As further evidence of efforts to develop CCS activities 
there are two main networks, the North Sea Basin Task Force and 
the Baltic Sea Region CCS Network which together have eight 
states cooperating in the development of transboundary solutions 
for the transport and geological storage of CO2.
47  
F. EU State Aids / Competition Law 
 
There may be those that point to State Aids/competition law 
restrictions on regulatory solutions for financial instruments, for 
long term liability regulation, further to the CCS Directive. It is 
noted that, to date, the UK (pre and post-Brexit) and German 
governments have taken a favourable position in this regard by 
adopting a flexible approach to State Aids, and it would appear that 
the European Commission is similarly disposed by reference to its 
 
43 Report from the Commission to the European Parliament and the 
Council on the Implementation of Directive 2009/31/EC on the Geological 
Storage of Carbon Dioxide, COM (2017) 37 Final, (Jan. 2, 2017). 
44 Report from the Commission to the European Parliament and the 
Council on the Implementation of Directive 2009/31/EC on the Geological 
Storage of Carbon Dioxide, COM (2019) 566 Final (Oct. 31, 2019). 
45 Id. 
46 Id. 
47 Id. 
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Guidelines on environmental and energy state aid for 2014–2020.48 
There is also a strong argument to suggest that, in its essence, 
carbon dioxide storage represents a public good or service, that 
fulfils a government function of mitigating climate change. By 
storing carbon, which would otherwise have been inevitably 
produced in order to satisfy energy demand, storage serves to 
mitigate climate change and to meet binding emissions reduction 
targets, which are placed upon governments within an EU and 
international legal context. Given the additional point that carbon 
storage may well turn out to be a cost versus revenue neutral 
activity, some easing of State Aids rules/competition law should 
apply. This argumentation is supported by the EU Treaty obligation 
of competition law to not obstruct the performance, in law or in 
fact, of the particular tasks assigned to services of general 
economic interest (i.e., arguably, the provision of carbon storage 
for climate change prevention and mitigation is such a general 
economic interest).49  
 
Thus far, leading Member State governments have taken a 
sensible approach to State Aid regulation and CCS. For this reason, 
it is not suggested that a formal procedure be commenced to review 
and amend the EU General Block Exemption Regulation or 
Guidelines on environmental and energy state aid for 2014–2020, 
with the aim of codifying new principles and rules in respect of 
CCS. This would constitute a drawn out and cumbersome process. 
Given the history of CCS Directive negotiation, there would be 
further uncertainty about the result and Member States and non-
State interests, which are without direct and active interests and 
projects in the field of CCS, would still be in a position to influence 
the outcome in a manner, which may not best serve Member States 
and private sector actors that wish to advance CCS technology. 
There is also the observation that, the revision of EU state aids 
regulation and guidance for CCS should have taken place at a time 
that was commensurate with the creation of the CCS Directive.  
 
In any event, the signs are that a flexible approach is being 
taken by CCS implementing states, to the interpretation of State 
Aids disciplines.  As such, it is anticipated that regulators will 
continue along these lines, as this approach has been further 
 
48 Guidelines on environmental and energy state aid for 2014–2020, 
2014 O.J. (C 200) 01. see also, Press Release, State Aid: Commission Approves 
UK Support Scheme for Early Study Work on Carbon Capture and Storage 
Demonstration Projects, 2013 O.J. (Mar. 20, 2013), 
https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/IP_13_254. 
49 The issues raised in this sub-section require more detailed treatment 
but are beyond the scope of this article. 
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reinforced in the GD4 document.  Specifically, the revisions that 
appear in the document contain new language, which discusses the 
possibility for Member States to provide some form of insurance 
(in the absence of an insurance market for CCS) through a form of 
risk-transfer. For example, this could appear as a surrender of 
allowances in exchange for a non-refundable premium. Notably, 
State Aids/competition law objections would only be invoked if the 
said insurance is found to have been provided in commercial 
conditions that are more favourable than those of the current 
market. Furthermore, in another notable final revision in favour of 
flexibility of policy/regulatory design, GD4 is not exhaustive as to 
other types of risk-sharing arrangements, which could be 
established, including individual risk-sharing arrangements with 
CCS operators, on a case-by-case basis. The only stipulation 
provided in the GD4 is that, “Where State aid within the meaning 
of Article 107(1) of the TFEU (Treaty for European Union) is 
involved in the establishment of the FS, in accordance with Article 
108 of the TFEU, that State aid must be notified and authorised by 
the Commission before it is granted.”50 This stipulation is merely a 
statement of applicable EU law. 
 
G. Summary 
 
Noting the further regulatory and guidance requirements, 
discussed in Section 2, and taking account of the financial, 
environmental and human health liabilities surrounding ownership 
of a storage facility under the CCS, ETS and Environmental 
Liability Directives, it is submitted that a cooperative or 
partnership-based approach to long term liabilities is required. This 
point is further underscored when EU leaders have legislated in a 
field for which there is no long-term liability insurance, thus 
depriving industry of traditional Act of God insurance clauses that 
apply in respect of naturally occurring events, which are beyond 
the control of industrial operators. In the field of CCS, this is a 
highly consequential omission and, thus, entails significant 
additional risk for storage site operators because 
earthquakes/tectonic plate shifts constitute the most significant 
type of risk, in relation to long-term CO2 storage. In the absence of 
a “cooperation” or “partner-based” approach, with the regulator, 
these events are uninsurable and hence, all the financial and 
liability-related risk is placed on the storage site operator.  
 
 
 
50 Directorate-General for Climate Action, supra note 23. 
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II. COMPETING JURISDICTIONS ARE STRETCHING FIRST 
MOVER ADVANTAGE 
 
A. First Mover Advantage through Regulation 
 
Within the United States, regional and state-level initiatives 
to address emissions from the power sector have been accompanied 
by state and regional funding initiatives in innovation and 
investment for carbon capture and storage. Federal initiatives alone 
amount to $11 billion in investment in CCS projects, with a further 
US-China Clean Energy Research Centre, aimed at joint CCS 
technology development and implementation. In respect of the 
most prominent such project funds (FutureGen), the states of 
Illinois and Texas waived any storage site operator long-term 
liabilities in respect of leakage for the (currently suspended) 
FutureGen project sites. Further to this point, in order to ameliorate 
permanent liability risk upon the private sector the states of Texas, 
Montana and North Dakota permit the transfer of liability to them. 
In this regard, it is noted that though federal regulation of CCS does 
exist in the form of the Environmental Protection Agency’s final 
permitting rule (for injection of CO2 for long term storage in Class 
Vi wells)51 state-level regulation leads the way with more investor-
friendly risk reduction mechanisms in the form of liability transfers 
and fewer and shorter post-injection regulatory requirements. In 
contrast, Federal Class VI well permitting leaves no room for 
transfer of liability from the permit holder to the state and has 50-
year post-injection site care requirements.  This is hardly an 
endorsement for private sector research and development or related 
investment in the CCS business.  Hence, the area of liability 
continues to receive significant attention in the United States.  
Canada follows the same pattern with the federal government 
maintaining relative regulatory silence while the sub-federal 
provinces particularly Alberta develop investment and user-
friendly approaches to CCS site permitting and liability 
management along the lines of the State of North Dakota. 
 
Still, according to the United States Environmental 
Protection Agency, carbon capture and storage is being seen as a 
key enabling technology in relation to the US energy mix. As such, 
CCS has been a focal point for significant research and 
development funding.  Electricity sector modelling suggests even 
faster initial penetration of CCS at commercial scale with carbon 
capture technology already being deployed at a coal-fired power 
 
51 Criteria and Standards Applicable to Class III Wells, 40 C.F.R. 
§146.31-4 (2020). 
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plant at Boundary Dam, Saskatchewan.52 Further to this point, five 
Class VI CCS storage permits have been issued, four for FutureGen 
and one for the Archer Daniels Midland (Illinois) Industrial CCS 
Project. Similarly, the COORETEC and Coal21 Programmes in 
Germany and Australia reinforce this perspective. Such 
jurisdictions tend to resonate with the IEA’s policy 
recommendation to address limits to long-term project liability 
(particularly in the demonstration phase) through project 
indemnification by government and other industry supportive 
measures.  
 
In Canada, as part of efforts to make Canada a global leader 
in carbon capture and storage, the government of Alberta alone has 
dedicated $2 billion to CCS projects as a centrepiece of greenhouse 
gas emissions mitigation through to 2050.53 Alberta's government 
has estimated that CCS could contribute approximately 70% of the 
province's CO2 mitigation efforts and intends to have several 
projects operational this year. The Weyburn project has been 
operating for more than a decade and provides an excellent 
example of how projects can operate across borders and boundaries 
(the Weyburn operations cover both sides of the US-Canadian 
border). 
 
In Alberta, the CCS Act amends the Mines and Minerals 
Act, so that a closure certificate will be issued upon the completion 
of a CCS Project. Thereafter, the government of Alberta will take 
on liability for the captured CO2, assuming all obligations of the 
party that injected it into the ground (the lessee) including: 
 
• Obligations as an owner and licensee under the Oil and Gas 
Conservation Act of the wells and facilities covered by the 
agreement that authorized the injection of the carbon 
dioxide;  
• Obligations as the person responsible for the injected 
captured carbon dioxide under the Environmental 
Protection and Enhancement Act; 
• Obligations as the operator under Part 6 of the 
Environmental Protection and Enhancement Act in respect 
of the land within the location of the agreement used by the 
lessee in relation to the injection of carbon dioxide; and  
• Obligations under the Surface Rights Act.  
 
 
52 U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency [EPA], EPA Analysis of the Lieberman-
Warner Climate Security Act of 2008 S. 2191 in 110th Congress, 2008. 
53 Id. 
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In Australia, as part of ongoing efforts to give industry assurances 
and respective investment in CCS storage sites, a time limit is set 
on litigation against CCS storage site operators (20 years following 
project closure) and the federal government has assumed long-term 
liability for leakage. These provisions are found in the Offshore 
Petroleum and Greenhouse Gas Storage Act. These time limits 
should prove to be of comfort to the commercial insurance 
industry, as it seeks to extend CCS insurance products beyond 
operational liability during the closure life of storage sites. 
Naturally, given prevailing regulatory requirements, the need for 
financial assurances and the potential length of storage, de-
commissioning and post-closure periods, the insurance industry 
has yet to develop and offer products or services in this regard. 
Zurich announced that it was making two CCS insurance products 
Carbon Capture and Sequestration Liability Insurance and the 
Geological Sequestration Financial Assurance available in 2009.54 
However, Royal Dutch Shell’s Peterhead Project could not find an 
underwriter owing to the lack of available underwriting 
information (absence of claims history, limited number of CCS 
projects for risk spreading and undefined liabilities).55  
 
Finally, The Norwegian Sleipner project is an important 
precedent, as we build the evidence base for CCS regulation around 
the world.  This is true for two reasons: thus far no significant 
leakage issues have arisen, and the project has progressed as 
expected in this regard; and, second, the Sleipner project itself 
benefitted significantly from a carbon emission tax of €40 t/CO2.  
As such, public sector participation in financing the project loomed 
large in incentivising CCS in this jurisdiction. Interestingly, the 
Sleipner Project is silent as to the liability of the Demonstration 
Project Operator, in effect absolving the Project of any long-term 
liability for leakage and transferring that responsibility to the 
government.  
 
B. First Mover Advantage through Demonstration Projects 
 
Against the analytical backdrop of the CCS Directive, there 
exists a legal argument that much of the planning, policy 
development and implementation-related activities, as well as 
contracting around Demonstration Phase projects, had already 
taken place prior to the CCS Directive enforcement date of 25 July 
 
54 Zurich, Advertisement on Carbon Capture and Storage Association, 
CCSASSOCIATION.ORG, http://www.ccsassociation.org/about-us/our-
members/zurich/ (last visited Feb. 4, 2020). 
55 News desk, Shell Sees Large Risk Premiums for Carbon Capture 
and Storage Cover, INSURANCETIMES (June 12, 2015). 
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2011. As such, Demonstration Phase projects would not be subject 
to the full legal requirements of the CCS Directive, at least with 
respect to long-term liability, as those projects face first-of-a-kind 
issues and risks. Furthermore, demonstration projects are necessary 
as a means of informing government policy on CCS, advancing 
first mover advantage, as well as better understanding the 
particulars of permit design.  
 
Equally, demonstration phase projects in Norway, Canada, 
the United States and Australia have not had long term liabilities 
placed on project operators, owing primarily to the first-of-a-kind 
research and development-based nature of such work and the good 
will that project operators have demonstrated, in sharing 
knowledge designed to advance CCS as a climate change 
mitigation option. 
 
If Europe is to maintain pace with these competing 
jurisdictions then, provided that moral hazard-related concerns can 
be addressed contractually, demonstration phase projects ought to 
be subject to a government indemnity, in respect of unintentional 
environmental damage. For demonstration phase projects that have 
advanced to the commercial storage stage it is appropriate to 
develop permit conditions for sites along the lines of the 
cooperative risk management and financial liability instruments 
advocated in this Article.   
 
C. Liability Case Studies in the Nuclear, Oil and Gas and 
Waste Management Sectors 
 
This section of the Article examines three mature 
regulatory regimes that may inform the manner in which liability 
should be managed in a CCS context. They are: the nuclear 
industry; landfill site regulation and the management of oil spills at 
sea. Aside from other self-evident conclusions, what appears from 
examining these schemes are more sophisticated approaches to risk 
management and financial liability sharing. By and large, capped 
liability schemes are a pervasive feature, and greater investment 
certainty is in place, even though the risk profiles of these sectors 
are at least as high as those for CCS storage. The nuclear facility 
example actually features a much higher overall risk profile. What 
we also see for these activities is a significantly more receptive 
response from the insurance sector, which is, arguably, one of the 
lynchpins to the long-term success of the CCS sector. 
 
With respect to the nuclear industry, the risk longevity for 
radioactive waste is considerable. High-level radioactive waste is 
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generally material from the core of the nuclear reactor or within 
nuclear warheads. Most of the radioactive isotopes in high-level 
waste emit large amounts of radiation and have extremely long 
half-lives (some longer than 100,000 years) creating long time 
periods before the waste will settle to safe levels of radioactivity. 
Therefore, the potential risks can last for 100,000 years. The risks 
of nuclear and CCS facilities are, in theory, similar in terms of the 
possibility of leakage. However, the leakage of radioactive 
materials would be more catastrophic. As well, serious risk 
longevity for radioactive material has a greater duration than for 
carbon dioxide.  Even though the likelihood of leakage is similar 
between the nuclear and CCS industries, depending upon scale and 
experience, the impact and consequences will be far greater for a 
radioactive leak with the liability period for CCS appearing to be 
trivial by comparison. 
 
In the UK, nuclear liabilities are covered by the Nuclear 
Installations Act 1965 as amended by the Nuclear Installations 
(Liability for Damage) Order 2016.56 Further to the 2016 revisions 
of the Act, the limit on liability stands at €700 million for each 
major installation. Therefore, the operator is liable for claims up to 
this amount and must insure accordingly. Beyond any available 
insurance coverage, the current Paris/Brussels system applies, with 
the government contribution to meet any shortfall in insurance 
coverage to meet the thresholds of €700 million (Paris claims) to 
€1,500 million (Brussels claims). Such insurance is available in 
large part because of these caps set on liability.  The majority of 
this insurance is provided by a pool of UK insurers comprising 
eight insurance companies and sixteen Lloyds syndicates (Nuclear 
Risk Insurers). This arrangement does not fall under state aids rules 
as it is set under an International Convention.  
 
In the United States of America, the Price-Anderson 
Nuclear Industries Indemnity Act (1957) establishes a no fault 
insurance-type system in which the first $121.25 million per 
reactor is payable by the operator when an accident occurs with a 
maximum liability cap per reactor per incident of $450 million.57 
Therefore, evidence of ability to pay is required as part of an 
operator’s permit conditions. Noting that there are 104 such 
reactors, £12.6 billion of the system is industry-funded through 
private nuclear insurance pools. Any claims between $121.25 
 
56 The Nuclear Installations (Liability for Damage) Order 2016, C. 
562 (Eng.), 
https://www.legislation.gov.uk/uksi/2016/562/pdfs/uksi_20160562_en.pdf. 
57 42 U.S. C. § 2210 (2006). 
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million and $450 million would be covered by the federal 
government. Thus far, a secondary insurance payout under this Act 
has not been required. By corollary, if CCS Directive transposition 
in the UK had resulted in a cap on liability, then the serious absence 
of insurance (e.g., Royal Dutch Shell’s Peterhead Project) for CCS 
storage site liability may well have been remedied. It would also 
have, arguably, incentivised private sector participation in carbon 
capture and storage. 
 
In respect of waste management and liability, landfill sites 
represent a potentially useful comparison with CCS storage sites, 
on the basis that both facilities entail risk of leakage during the site 
life and well beyond it. Both sites feature risks that arise beneath 
the Earth’s surface (and as such are conventionally out of view) 
and both risks may be large. In respect of liability, insurance cover 
is needed for the long duration of the closure-related sealing and 
inspection period for landfill (possibly 20-30 years). This is 
expected to cover public and employee liability, from methane 
leaks to injuries, and to indemnify the operator or the authority 
from any continuing liability. The fact that such insurance exists is 
a key reason why the private sector is involved in the landfill 
business.58 Arguably, a state role in advancing public goods and 
services such as waste management, environmental protection and, 
by analogy, climate change mitigation is justified if not mandated 
by law in the public interest.59 
 
With respect to oil and gas spills at sea, they are comparable 
to Carbon Capture and Storage’s financial and regulatory aspects 
in the sense that, in both cases, an international pool fund may be 
appropriate in case of incidents, such as leakage or structural failure 
of seagoing vessels. Accordingly, funds could be drawn down to 
cover the cost of damages. The consequences of the failure of both 
cases (i.e. oil and gas spills and CCS) are broadly similar. When 
such vessels fail or leak, oil and gas get released into water and the 
atmosphere. The failure of CCS infrastructure has analogous 
consequences. If there is a leak in deep geological formations, the 
 
58 Interestingly, waste management sector public fund schemes exist 
at country level in order to address post-closure costs. DuPage County Illinois 
set up a $232 million public fund in order to cover potential post-closure costs 
for nine landfills. see Concerned Citizens of Cattaraugus County, Inc., 
Municipal Liability for Pollution, CONCERNEDCITIZENS.HOMESTEAD (Apr. 1, 
2008), http://concernedcitizens.homestead.com/municipal_liability.html. 
59 Borden Ladner Gervais, Canada: The Non-Polluter Pays: 
Municipal Liability For Cleaning Up Migrating Contamination, Mondaq (Dec. 
11, 2012), https://www.mondaq.com/canada/Environment/210938/The-Non-
Polluter-Pays-Municipal-Liability-For-Cleaning-Up-Migrating-
Contamination? 
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captured CO2 is released into the atmosphere and in case there is a 
leak in the ocean, the captured CO2 is released into the hydrosphere 
with similar risks to the environment as those of oil and gas spills. 
 
Further to the 1992 Convention on Liability and 
Compensation for Oil Pollution Damage, an international fund for 
compensation for pollution damage named “The International Oil 
Pollution Compensation Fund 1992” pays the costs and damages 
resulting from an accident, of course, providing that the Fund 
cannot prove that the accident was intentional or occurred as a 
result of negligence and misconduct. 
 
A tanker owner's liability limit, under the Civil Liability 
Convention, depends on the size of the tanker. The liability limits 
set out in the Civil Liability Convention, in respect of claims 
following a spill of persistent oil, are as follows: 
 
• For all tankers with a gross tonnage up to 5,000: 4.51 
million Special Drawing Rights (SDR)(approximately $7 
million);  
• For tankers with a gross tonnage of between 5,000 and 
140,000: 4.51 million SDR plus 631 SDR (approximately 
$1,000) for each gross ton in excess of 5,000; and  
• For tankers with a gross tonnage of 140,000 and over: 89.77 
million SDR (approximately $140 million). 
 
As with the nuclear liability analogy, the existence of a cap on 
liability, in addition to insurance, is not coincidental. Both elements 
form the minimum basis for private sector participation in these 
sectors. By analogy, CCS regulation should facilitate the existence 
of these mechanisms if private sector participation is to be both 
fruitful and competitive with other CCS jurisdictions. 
 
III. OPTIONS AND FORWARD-LOOKING SCENARIOS 
 
D. CCS Regulation in the USA 
 
Due to the relative uncertainty, over potentially isolated 
significant leakage incidents, commercial insurers are currently 
shying away from long term liability insurance provisions for CCS, 
though they are committing to operational insurance (e.g. Zurich 
Financial Services). Experience dictates that environmental 
regulators look to insurers for the design of environmental liability 
legislative provisions. Where long-term liabilities are uninsurable, 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2020]   ADVANCING CARBON CAPTURE & STORAGE TECH   37 
 
 
then it is of critical importance to create other investment 
incentives and create mechanisms, which effectively share the risk 
(and potential liability) beyond the storage operator. Otherwise, 
industry will be unwilling to internalise the risk and promising 
initiatives may well fail. There is considerable discussion of USA-
style options when moving forward with CCS in Europe, in part 
because Anglo-American policy and regulatory culture have some 
similarities by comparison to other jurisdictions, and also because 
the United States has been a historical leader in environmental 
regulation.  
Furthermore, the US has the longest history of carbon 
dioxide injection into reservoirs for the purposes of Enhanced 
Hydrocarbon Recovery (EHR) – a technology whose risk profile 
closely resembles that of CCS. It is also one of the countries which 
has best managed to take CCS from R&D into the market. It must 
be noted that, while the existing US Federal framework currently 
does not provide for a release or transfer of liability from the 
operator to other persons, several state legislatures, including those 
with actual experience of carbon dioxide injection through EHR, 
have chosen to adopt legislation that provides for transfer of long-
term liability to the respective State by various mechanisms. These 
options include:  
 
• States agreeing to take on the long-term liability by 
undertaking the CCS project themselves; 
• States assuming liability from CCS operators or; 
• States providing a mechanism for transfer of liability. 
 
Furthermore, a number of States have begun to establish local 
regimes for long-term liability transfer. Louisiana, Montana, North 
Dakota, Oklahoma and Texas have developed a “Certificate of 
Completion” model, whereby the operator of a geologic 
sequestration site can transfer title and liability to the State, after 
demonstrating to the relevant agency that the site is stable for a 
certain period of time, after the last CO2 has been injected, and that 
the site has been closed. The states of Illinois and Texas have also 
accepted liability for certain CCS pilot projects from the project 
outset.   
 
E. Regulatory and Financing Options 
 
Broadly speaking, the US approach to CCS is characterized 
by a reliance on the existing framework for long-term liability and 
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stewardship, the adoption of substantive or procedural limitations 
on claims and the creation of funds to support long-term 
stewardship activities. The said approach also features 
compensation of parties for various losses or damages incurred 
after site closure, as well as in some cases the transfer of liability 
to the federal government after site closure (with certain 
contingencies). Figure 2 illustrates our professional judgment as to 
some of the most relevant regulatory and financing options that 
have been used by individual State legislatures, or have been 
suggested as sound financing mechanisms from the risk averse US 
Environmental Protection Agency, which has now taken over the 
Federal regulation of CCS projects. Included are also the most 
widely discussed options from the International Energy Agency, as 
well as those scenarios suggested in the EU Commission Guidance 
Documents and by our research team. 
 
Figure 2: Our Graphic Representation of Regulatory and 
Financial Options for Management of CCS Risk 
 Looking at our Figure 2, we can see that some financing or 
regulatory options may be more suited to different levels of 
maturity of CCS technology. When a project is still in its 
demonstration phase, operators often face first-of-a-kind issues. 
Thus, a flexible regulatory approach, which is still compliant with 
the tenets of the EU CCS Directive, can allow for the development 
of a regulatory framework for CCS in a manner that is integrated 
with the process of technological evolution and competitive 
leadership.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2020]   ADVANCING CARBON CAPTURE & STORAGE TECH   39 
 
 
A flexible approach from regulators, particularly at the 
Demonstration phase, can include such measures as the adoption 
of Substantive or Procedural Claims, government Liability or the 
creation of a Project Based Emissions Trading Scheme (ETS). 
Substantive or Procedural Claims would be advantageous in that 
they would help to ease uncertainties from the business and 
insurance communities over the extent of potential liabilities and 
address uncertain or inconsistent government standards. The 
adoption of ‘Liability by the government’ can take on many forms, 
depending on the involvement at certain stages of CCS, i.e. 
governmental ownership of CO2, ownership of pipelines or other 
equipment, or even governmental oversight, financing, and 
encouragement of CCS activities.  
 
Structuring a regulatory programme in the demonstration 
phase, so that the government is directly liable for CCS activities, 
could reduce the complexity of assigning long-term liability for 
those pilot phase projects. Additionally, for relevant States that 
have not already done so [China and the European Union have 
while Canada (federally), the USA (federally) and the Middle East 
have yet to do so], the creation of a Project-Based ETS can be a 
part of a trial sectoral approach to GHG mitigation, that would 
allow for the testing of the way in which ETS credits are best 
compensated, thereby overcoming the issue of Double-Counting 
under the EU ETS and Environmental Liability Directives. 
 
The rollout of different regulatory or financial measures, 
alongside the maturation of CCS, is an approach that would not 
only allow for the creation of best-fit techno-regulatory regimes, 
but would also support the parallel testing of such policy/regulatory 
options as CCS technology develops. 
 
In the transitional phase between demonstration and full-
scale deployment, the most appropriate regulatory measures are 
arguably the gradual Liability Transfer to a federal government 
level and the integration of CCS into a wider (EU or international) 
Cap and Trade regime. With the transition of CCS into the 
demonstration phase, the financial and environmental risks would 
be much better established, allowing governments and private 
insurers to better manage the associated potential liabilities.  
Possible additional financial mechanisms, for regulation at such a 
phase, include Discount Rate application, Escrow, Trust Funds and 
Storage Bonds. These types of mechanisms are characterised by 
the convergence of private fundraising options, under the oversight 
of a governmentally appointed body. They would enable the 
effective pooling of resources for leakage compensation and could 
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potentially be applied to CCS operators (in the event of liability not 
being transferred to National Authorities). This would help pave 
the way for the creation of a strong international regulatory 
framework around CCS. 
 
Once full-scale deployment is reached, regulatory measures 
can be enacted via the Transfer of Liability Post Site-Closure to a 
government body. This would, ideally, occur under the auspices of 
an International Agreement on Long-term Liability, so as to allow 
for the creation of best fit options between capture and storage 
operators around the world, as well as to open up the use of CCS 
credits under the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM). 
Nationally, governments could enact Legislation Facilitating 
Private Insurance Coverage or perhaps mandate a tax tied to a 
super-fund, similar for that of oil spills. The level of revenue, raised 
through such schemes, could thereby be set at an adequate level to 
cover estimated liabilities. Depending on the levy amount, the cost 
of CCS installation, and the credits given/taxes avoided by CCS 
operators, would potentially be an incentivising and long-term 
liability minimising mechanism for the drawing in of CCS 
investors. 
 
Alternatively, Extended Crediting Periods or Fees also 
represent financial alternatives that would rely on monitoring 
results and, thereby, act as a form of security buffer for CCS 
operators, especially at capture sites.  
 
F. Examples from other Jurisdictions 
 
Some real-world examples, of flexible approaches to CCS 
regulation, can be seen in the case of Norway, Australia, Canada 
and the USA. Norway has incentivised CCS by legislating a carbon 
emissions tax of €40 t/CO2. CCS is regulated both under the 
Norwegian Pollution Act and the Petroleum Act. However, at the 
present time responsibility for leakages is not satisfactorily 
regulated under Norwegian law.  
 
The long term liability associated with the storage of CO2 
in Australia is for now covered under the Research Development 
and Demonstration approval provision, under the Victorian 
Environment Protection Act, which recognises that more 
comprehensive legislative cover would be necessary in the future, 
for any commercial geo-sequestration projects. Canadian 
legislation, on the other hand, has taken the approach of issuing 
closure certificates under a CCS Act with the government (of the 
province in question) assuming responsibility for the stored CO2. 
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Adopting a flexible regulatory approach, the US EPA, has 
finalised requirements for CCS through the development of 
permitting for a new class of storage wells (Class VI), to be used 
specifically for geological storage of CO2. The EPA has proposed 
a default 50-year timeframe for CCS liability with the provision 
that the acting EPA Director may shorten or lengthen that period, 
based on risk data gathered during the permitting process. 
Additionally, this new permitting system will allow for financial 
guarantees for CCS to be chosen from a variety of different options, 
which would allow for greater market competition and rapid 
deployment of lower-cost solutions in the CCS industry. 
 
Within the EU, two legislatures stand out as having a 
progressive view on CCS regulation while still adhering to the 
letter of the CCS Directive: Germany and the Netherlands. The 
government of the Netherlands implemented the CCS Directive by 
amending the Netherlands Mining Act, which requires that CCS 
would operate under a Permitting regime (similar to that of the US). 
Preliminary analysis indicates that liability will lie with the storage 
license holder, up to the point of the license expiration. If at that 
point there is a legal successor, or the materials are proven to be 
definitively left in the subsoil, the liability would be removed from 
the license holder. Furthermore, it is likely that the Dutch 
government will set up a fund to deal with unexpected damages at 
storage sites, perhaps similar to the one for oil spills.60 
 
In 2009, the German government mooted a draft Carbon 
Capture Storage Act on CCS, which allows it to conduct extensive 
testing of the technology, on the basis of which further requisite 
implementing legislation will be drafted. Importantly, the draft Act 
includes the possibility that, after a period of 30 years from the 
decommissioning of a plant, and thus about 80 years after its start-
up, operators may transfer their responsibility to the Federal 
government (once the operator has established proof of the long-
term safety of the storage site).61 The draft Act has not become into 
force. However, with the re-emergence of support for CCS by the 
German government as of 2019 we are likely to see CCS legislation 
again soon. On another note, the CCS Demonstration Project 
 
60 Bellona Foundation, New Dutch government puts CO2 capture and 
storage at forefront in climate plan, BELLONA.ORG (Oct. 11, 2017), 
https://bellona.org/news/ccs/2017-10-24057. (How that relates to potential 
damages remains to be seen). 
61 H. Weyer, Legal framework for CCS in the EU and Germany, in 
Clean Energy Systems in the Subsurface: Production, Storage and Conversion 
21-8, (Michael Z. Hou et. al. eds., (2013). 
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Network, which is sponsored by the European Commission, has 
also expressed the belief that long-term CCS liability will be dealt 
with in the manner of oil spills – with “the state assuming liability 
after a regulated abandonment process”. 
  
G. Summary and Recommendations 
 
When considering regulatory and financial scenarios for the 
management of CCS liability, we have discussed a public/private 
liability fund (which, in essence provides an insurance function in 
the absence of commercial insurance) as an over-arching 
mechanism, standing at the interface of government oversight and 
private finance, and which has the potential to be adapted and 
expanded alongside the maturation and upscaling of CCS 
technology. Such a fund could set a threshold of liability for storage 
site operators, beyond which public liability insurance or 
indemnification would apply. A CCS fund can be adapted to grow 
alongside the rate of creation of CCS projects. Additionally, if risk 
is factored in, it would allow for a fair contribution by each operator 
and would be a more proportionate method of accounting for the 
probability of a leak (noting that fund contributions would be 
individually earmarked to indemnification events that are specific 
to each fund contributor – such that cross subsidisation of other 
firms is not possible). Even though it might not be an immediately 
appealing option to operators, due to concerns about cross-
subsidisation of competitors,62 the creation of a liability fund of this 
nature has the potential to be a vital cornerstone for the 
establishment of a private insurance market for CCS. 
Public/Private Liability Funds can bolster confidence with regard 
to the risk profiles of CCS activities and spark the interest of private 
insurance firms.  
 
Regardless of the position on the establishment of 
Public/Private liability funds, a government/public indemnification 
scheme ought to be set up during the demonstration phase of CCS 
technology rollouts, in order to ensure that there is investment from 
private sector stakeholders. On the basis of the analysis undertaken 
thus far, this Article supports the use of a government liability (also 
known as Indemnification) framework for demonstration projects 
along the lines of competing CCS jurisdictions. In order to address 
“moral hazard” arguments, exceptions to governmental liability 
 
62 By this we mean that cross subsidisation should be prohibited such 
that any payments made by one storage site operator should not be used to 
indemnify adversely affected parties or environmental damage caused through 
a leak that is the responsibility of another storage site operator. 
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could be established around concepts of operator fault or 
negligence (see the Environmental Liability Directive) and a duty 
to apply best available techniques in the demonstration phase along 
the lines of the Industrial Emissions Directive.63 
 
Furthermore, demonstration project operators can assure 
Competent Authorities of their financial stability though Trust 
Funds, Escrows or Storage Bonds and, thereby, demonstrate their 
ability to handle operational risk within the required time frame. In 
cases of operator default, a payment of surety bonds can contribute 
to a standby trust fund in the amount equal to the face value of the 
bond and sufficient to cover estimated costs; a performance surety 
bond guarantees performance of the specific activity or payment of 
an amount equivalent to the estimated costs into a standby trust 
fund. 
 
It must be noted that while a range of possible options has 
been accepted by the authors as workable, there are certain 
overriding features that should be applied from the date upon which 
a long-term liability framework is set up for CCS. The first aim 
should be to create the market conditions in which private 
insurance products can be offered in the CCS market. This 
proposition is advanced on the basis that private sector insurers are 
the world’s leading experts in risk management pertaining to 
environmental technology and will provide the best means for 
allocating financial risk with the interests of civil society in mind. 
 
Further to these observations, long term liability for CCS 
storage should be extended to a maximum approximating 
£50,000,000, having regard to other types of damage and 
remediation costs in the field of environmental protection law. 
Claims over £50,000,000 should be absorbed by a public insurance 
mechanism or other public guaranty. Equally, greater regulatory 
certainty should be established by specifying a maximum period of 
time (somewhere between 20 and 30 years is reasonable and can 
be accommodated without the amendment of the CCS Directive) 
after which there should be a transfer of responsibility for a closed 
storage site to competent authorities.   
 
These two measures should be sufficient to create a private 
sector insurance market for CCS. To incentivise cutting edge CCS 
technology development and to provide for the best storage sites, 
 
63 Directive 2010/75 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 
24 November 2010 on Industrial Emissions, Integrated Pollution Prevention 
and Control, 2010 O.J. (L 334) 17. 
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the £50,000,000 threshold should be subject to adjustment 
depending upon three criteria, namely: storage site characteristics, 
technical competence of the operator and the financial capacity of 
the operator to address CCS risk. The threshold amount for each 
site should be subject to review every five years.  
 
Finally, exemption from the purchase of ETS Directive (or 
similar State schemes) allowances in proportion to the amount of 
greenhouse gases stored, is completely justified by the aims of 
climate change mitigation and surrounding international, EU or 
other applicable national laws. However, in a European-style or 
analogous context, the duty to purchase allowances in relation to 
leakage serves little in terms of policy purpose. This is because the 
duty of remediation and supporting penalties in respect of the 
Environmental Liability Directive and the CCS Directive provide 
Competent Authorities with ample means of punishing and 
remediating leak-based damage including climate-related damage. 
This point is made in the knowledge that CO2 stream providers to 
CCS storage sites will be legally required to capture CO2 in the 
future.  
 
CONCLUSION 
 
Ambitious emissions reduction targets for the near future 
driven by the Paris Agreement and the suitability of Carbon 
Capture technology for that purpose, have combined to propel CCS 
development on a global level as a contributing response to climate 
change. As carbon capture is “low-hanging fruit” and involves 
technological and scientific knowledge already available to a wide 
range of actors in the energy industry, it allows for a relatively low-
cost method (compared to the true cost of nuclear or offshore wind 
power) for industrial stakeholders to contribute to climate change 
mitigation targets, set forth by governments.   
 
As it stands, CCS legislation is comprised of an overlapping 
network of international agreements and regional (in the case of the 
EU) policies. In unison, they form a strong basis for environmental 
protection from leakage of carbon storage sites, through the use of 
the precautionary and polluter pays principles. However, these 
legislative instruments form an uncoordinated legal basis for CCS, 
with overly stringent financial and liability provisions. At present, 
this poses a significant barrier to stakeholder investment, 
technology development and roll-out.  
 
Carbon Capture and Storage will have to unfold in a 
competitive energy sector and holds within it ramifications for 
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energy security. Unfortunately, the current overly guarded 
regulation frameworks that we find, particularly at the EU level, 
are restrictive to CCS evolution and competition. Therefore, 
governments are advised to work with industry in providing clear 
regulatory solutions for a predictable investment framework for 
CCS. This would allow for the tailoring of legislation and policy, 
having in mind the international legal basis for CCS, to the specific 
investment and regulatory climate of a given country. Furthermore, 
it would take advantage of pre-existing good relationships between 
policymakers and industry, which can lead to invaluable feedback 
on the appropriateness and ramifications of regulatory decisions. 
Ultimately, it is suggested that this would enhance the precision of 
monitoring activities and allow for a more inclusive approach to 
risk management measures.  
 
A flexible approach to CCS liability provisions is not 
necessarily unique or unprecedented. In fact, selective flexibility is 
being adopted across a range of CCS stakeholders acting in 
national contexts. Norway, the USA, Canada and Australia have 
shown an innovative approach to handling liabilities and often 
make clear distinctions between demonstration and commercial 
phases of the technology, in terms of the burden of payment for the 
operator. The European Union itself is moving towards a more 
amenable interpretation of the CCS Directive as evidenced by the 
positions put forward in successive Commission Guidance 
Documents. Furthermore, there is every indication that the 
paramount issue standing in the way of CCS - the uncertainty over 
the nature and attribution of liability arising from leakage - could 
be addressed by a combination of some form of insurance 
framework for storage sites and a robust permitting process 
(formulated from governmental best practice policies), which 
would minimize the likelihood of leakage to virtually zero. 
Therefore, there are excellent reasons for law and policymakers to 
seriously consider a more flexible, innovative approach to CCS 
legislation and policies, by taking into account the issue of long-
term liability and other significant legislative barriers to the 
necessary dissemination of CCS technology in the near future. 
After all, negative emissions technologies are a necessary 
component of successful Paris Agreement compliance and our 
elusive quest to stabilise the world’s greenhouse gas emissions.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
